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I.
INTRODUCTION

As stated

the opening brief, this is an appeal from a criminal conviction following a

jury trial. Prior to his conviction, Blair Olsen was the Sheriff of Jefferson County. He was
convicted on tlu·ee separate counts of violating Idaho Code section 18-5701(10)(misuse of public
funds) for the single decision of pennitting his wife to use his back-up cell phone, a phone that
was authorized by the Board of County Commissioners and paid for by Jefferson County. Mrs.
Olsen's personal use of the authorized back-up cell phone did not financially hann or even
incidentally impact the county in any way, as this incidental use did not cause any additional
expense for the county. This appeal asserts the following errors in the prosecution: (1) the trial
court's failure to dismiss the criminal action because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
since the appropriateness of the use of public funds under these circumstances is a political
question, thus barring a criminal charge; (2) the trial court's failure to dismiss on constitutional
due process grounds, because the charging statute, Idaho Code section 18-5701(10), addressing
the misuse of public funds, is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the trial court's refusal to
properly apply the constitutional Double Jeopardy doctrine after prosecutors

charged one

singular act as multiple criminal counts.
The State has attempted to change the very nature of the case in the Respondent's brief
by arguing that Blair Olsen was charged with paying for his "wife's cell phone service with
public money." This alters the actual charges contained in the indictment. The indictment states
that Blair Olsen violated the law by "providing his wife a cell phone with service paid for by
Jefferson County for her personal use." Tr. p. 11. This change in the characterization of the
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charges against Blair Olsen causes the State to misapply the law and facts in the Respondent's
Brief. The State does not dispute the statement of facts as contained in the Appellant's opening
That statement of facts is reincorporated herein by reference. The State does reiterate the
T1ial Judge's inconect recollections about what evidence was in the record while ignming the
citations to the record that refuted the Tiial Judge's erroneous factual conclusions. As will be
shown below, the State's arguments do not comport with the facts in the record or the law in the
state of Idaho.
The State does not address all the law and arguments made in the opening b1ief. The law
and arguments will not be repeated here in their entirety but are incorporated by reference. This
Reply Brief is intended to address the arguments raised by the State and the fact that an argument
from the opening Biief is not presented again is not intended as a waiver or abandonment of such
arguments.
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The State rephrases the issues. The issues are essentially the same but the State does alter
the factual circumstances and characte1izes the issues in a maimer that is not consistent with the
record. The issues as stated in the opening Biief are reproduced here for ease of reference.
1.

When the detennination of a public purpose for an expenditure is left to the Jefferson

County Board of Commissioners, did the tiial court err in not dismissing the criminal action
because it would require insertion of the judiciary into a "political question" in violation of the
bedrock p1inciple of constitutional separation of powers?
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2.

\Vas Blair Olsen's fundamental, constitutional right to Due Process violated because the

criminal statute at issue was unconstitutionally vague, resulting in arbitrary enforcement and a

3.

\Vas the constitutional principle of double jeopardy violated when the State used a single

decision by Blair Olsen to serve as a basis for three separate felony counts?

III.
ARGUMENT

A.

Political questions cannot, by constitutional mandate, be determined by the judicial
system without violating the bedrock principle of separation of powers, thus this
case should have been dismissed.
The State begins by reciting the Trial Judge's basis for denying the post-trial motion. The

Tiial Judge did detem1ine that the Jefferson County Commissioners did not know anything about
the cell phone in Marie Olsen's possession until after the use was discontinued. However, as was
demonstrated in the opening Brief, the C01mnissioners testified that the phone was in Marie's
possession when they conducted their investigation and that it "was up to the sheriff' to decide
whether to allow Marie to continue using the phone. Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 9, L. 5-20.
Commissioner Hegsted testified that the Board approved the bill that was questioned by the
county clerk. Tr. of Hegsted Trial Test. p. 19, L. 21 - p. 20, L. 2. Before that bill was paid,
Commissioner Karren testified that the Commissioners became fully aware through their
investigation that the phone was in Marie's possession and that she was using it to make personal
calls. Tr. of Karren T1ial Test. p. 7, L. 20 - p. 9, L. 13. In her testimony Commissioner Karren
stated:
A. An employee at the clerk's office called me with that concern. And I believe I
went right in, and she explained to me about a cell phone that the sheriff had and
Appellant's Reply Brief - Page 3

that she believed that his wife was using. And as soon as she told me that, I went
over to the She1iff s Office and asked him about it. And he explained to me that it
was his backup phone and that his wife had the phone to
it charged and to
keep it accessible to him. And that made perfect sense to me, rather than having it
in a drawer stashed some\vhere.
Q. So the purpose that the defendant told you about, was that it was to keep it
charged and to keep it accessible for his use; is that correct?

P1... Tl1at's con-ect.

Q. \Vhat did he tell you about her personal use of the phone?
A. That she did use it for personal use because she had it. And, you know, I can't
see having a cell phone that's not used, might as well use it. And she was
available to answer it if a call came for him as well.
Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 7, L. 20 - p. 8, L. 16. It was only after obtaining this infomrntion that
Commissioner Kanen called for the executive session. Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 8, L. 5-1 O; Tr.
of Raymond Trial Test. p. 25, L. 6 - p. 27, L. 1O; p. 31, L. 11 - p. 32, L. 3; Tr. of Hegsted Tiial
Test. p. 19, L. 21 - p. 20, L. 2. It was with full knowledge that the phone was in Marie's
possession and that she was using it for personal calls that the Commissioners approved the cell
phone bill brought to their attention by the court clerk. Tr. of Hegsted Trial Test. p. 19, L. 21 - p.
20, L. 2. The State does not even address this testimony by the County Commissioners or the fact
that the Trial Judge's recollection of their testimony was wrong. Thus, the Trial Judge's basis for
his ruling was erroneous and this was not an attempt to retroactively approve conduct that had
ceased. It was approval of conduct that was ongoing when the investigation co1mnenced.
The State then cites to some of the law that specifically prevents the judicial branch from
reviewing the discretionary acts of the other branches of government. In re SRBA Case No.

39576, 128 Idaho 246, 261, 912 P.2d 614, 629 (1995). However, it then concludes that because
Idaho Code section 18-570 I (10) was passed by the Legislature that this was a proper matter for
Appellant's Reply Brief - Page 4

a jury to decide under the first of the Baker factors. 1 That first factor is "whether the constitution
directs that the issue be resolved by a coordinate branch of government." Id. The State does not
identify what powers have been delegated to county commissions directly by the constitution or
by statute. The Idaho Constitution and Idaho statutes commit the county's police power,
executive authority, and purchasing power to the board of county commissioners. Idaho Const.
art. XII, § 2; LC. § 31-828; LC. 31-810. Under these powers the Jefferson County
Commissioners had direct authority to detern1ine whether to authorize the Sheriff to have a backup cell phone that was carried by his wife. It is important to remember that the Jefferson County
Commissioners specifically detem1ined that there was a valid public purpose for the She1iff to
have access to a back-up cell phone and that his wife's personal use of that phone did not result
in any additional expense for Jefferson County. Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 24, L. 14 -p. 25, L.
6; Tr. of Raymond Trial Test. p. 31, L. 11-22. The issue of whether to approve a back-up cell
phone for a sheriff and whether his wife can carry it and make personal phone calls with it are
issues within the power and authority specifically delegated to the Jefferson County
Commissioners. The first Baker factor is satisfied.
Similarly, this judicial decision has demonstrated a lack of respect for the Jefferson
County Board of C01runissioners. The Commissioners have exclusive authority for supervising
County officials, expending County funds for governmental purpose, and auth01izing claims for

1 As stated in the briefs that have been submitted, the Idaho Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Baker factors
have been adopted in Idaho. In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 261, 912 P.2d 614, 629 (1995)
(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The Baker factors are: "(l) whether the
constitution directs that the issue be resolved by a coordinate branch of government; (2) whether judicially
manageable standards exist for the resolution of the issue; (3) whether it is possible to render a decision
without making an initial nonjudicial policy detennination; (4) whether judicial resolution would evince a lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) whether there is an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) whether judicial resolution would embarrassingly result
in varied rules among separate departments of government on a single question." Id.
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use of County funds. The Commissioners in this case completed a full investigation of the
matter and dete1111ined

there \Jvas a valid govenm1ental purpose

that there \Vas no additional

to

for her

the back-up cell phone
use of the cell phone.

Again, spending on law enforcement is an area specifically reserved for county conunissioners.
Idaho law states:
The legislature recognizes that the counties of the state perform vital functions
in administering and delivering law enforcement services to all residents of the
state. The legislature fu1iher finds it is necessary that the boards of county
commissioners of the counties of the state be able to address the needs of
county-provided components of the justice system by funding them at levels
,vhich do not compromise the performance of the justice system as a whole
and which advance the interests of the public, while protecting the 1ights of
individuals involved with the justice system.
LC.§ 31-4601 (emphasis added). The Jefferson County Conu11issioners determined that
funding a back-up cell phone for Sheriff Olsen was in the public interest and allowing his wife to
carry the phone and make personal calls did not increase the cost to the County.
Even if a comi disagrees with the action taken by a legislative body, such as a board of
conu11issioners, the court is to defer to the legislative body. In State v. Clark, this Court stated:
The courts may differ with the legislature as to the wisdom and propriety of a
particular enactment as a means of accomplishing a particular end, but as long as
there are considerations of public health, safety, morals, or general welfare which
the legislative body may have had in mind, which have justified the regulation, it
must be assumed by the court that the legislative body had those considerations in
mind and that those considerations did justify the regulation. When the necessity
or propriety of an enactment is a question upon which reasonable minds might
differ, the propriety and necessity of such enactment is a matter of legislative
detennination.

State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 376, 399 P.2d 955, 961 (1965) (upholding the validity of a county
subdivision ordinance). "'Vhere the Board of County Commissioners acts on matters within

its jurisdiction and no appeal is taken, then the act becomes final and is not subject to
Appellant's Reply B1ief - Page 6

collateral attack." Udy v. Cassia County, 65 Idaho 585, 149 P.2d 999 (1944) (emphasis added);
v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 134, 139 P.3d 732, 736 (2006). Attributing finality to

the action of a political entity is a dominant consideration

the Baker analysis. Baker v. Carr,

369 U.S. 186, 210, 82 S. Ct. 691, 706, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). A failure to defer to the authority
of the Jefferson County Commissioners as an executive and legislative body would "evince a
lack of the respect due" to the Jefferson County Commissioners as a coordinate branch of
govenm1ent and fail to give their decision the finality the law requires. In re SRBA Case No.
39576, 128 Idaho at 261, 912 P.2d at 629. Thus, the fourth Baker factor is applicable.

Finally, judicial resolution of this issue will emban-assingly result in differing outcomes
on this same issue in separate departments of govenm1ent. Id. Allowing comis to reconsider
discretionary spending decisions by County Commissioners will inevitably lead to different rules
among different counties and city govenm1ents. These types of discretionary spending issues
should be entirely within the exclusive purview of local governments. Allowing the comis to
arbitrarily review discretionary spending decisions by coordinate branches of government will
result in uncertainty and different application of the law in by different governmental entities in
the state of Idaho.
The State goes on to argue that there is no en-or by the Trial Judge because he "rejected
the factual underpi1mings" of the arguments in suppo1i of political question doctrine. The issue
that the State fails to address is that the Trial Judge's rejection of the "factual underpinnings"
was inconsistent with the testimony at trial. This was not a retroactive ratification of completed
conduct. The undisputed facts are that the back-up cell phone was in Marie Olsen's possession
when the Commissioners started investigating the matter and that they approved the bill that was
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brought to them by a county clerk with full knowledge that Marie had been using the back-up
phone for personal use. The Trial Judge's basis for his decision is not just inconsistent with the
factual record, the reasonmg 1s directly contradicted

the trial testimony of

County

Commissioners.
The State summarily dismisses most of the law and arguments raised in the opening
Brief. Those arguments will not be restated here but they are reincorporated by reference. The
law clearly provides that authority to decide the issue involving the cell phone resides with the
Jefferson County Commissioners. The Court may not like the decision reached by the
Commissioners but it has no jurisdiction to review that decision. As such, the Trial Judge erred
in failing to vacate the conviction and dismiss the criminal case against Blair Olsen.
B.

Due Process was violated by application of a criminal statute that produced
arbitrary enforcement and thus did not provide the required notice of vrhat conduct
·was prohibited. The action should have been dismissed.
The State argues that Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) is not void for vagueness because

it "clearly applies to Olsen's conduct." Brief of Respondent, p. 10. The State says that Olsen was
knowingly using public money to pay for the service on his "wife's private cell phone." This
conclusion is riddled with factual inaccuracies. First, Blair Olsen never made a single cell phone
payment. He submitted a claim to the County Conunissioners who then authorized payment of
the cell phone bill. Olsen never made any payments or purchases regarding the back-up cell
phone using County funds. All payments were made by the Jefferson County C01mnissioners. As
well, the cell phone in Marie's possession was not her personal cell phone. It was undisputed at
t1ial that Marie Olsen was in possession of Sheriff Olsen's back-up cell phone. Marie's personal
use of the cell phone did not result in any additional expense for Jefferson County. The funds
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being expended were for a back-up cell phone for the Sheriff. The primary purpose for which
funds were being used was to provide an additional method to contact Sheriff Olsen in an
emergency or in the event his primary cell phone became inoperable.
The State concludes that the use of public money to purchase cars, computers and phones
that have incidental personal use are "clearly outside the scope of the statute" because the
purpose for the purchase was not personal use but to allow government employees to do their
jobs or do them better. The State does not show how this differs from the situation in this case.
The primary purpose for the back-up cell phone was to benefit the County by allowing another
method of contacting the Sheriff. This clearly helps him do his job or to do it better. This same
cell phone number for the cell phone that was in Maiie's possession was one of two cell phones
used to contact Sheriff Olsen during a flood that occurred in 1997. Conu11issioner Hegsted
witnessed Sheriff Olsen using two cell phones at the same time, one at each ear, coordinating
\Vith local, state and federal agencies during the 1997 flood. Tr. of KaITen Trial Test. p. 30, L. 513. In fact, pictures taken during the flood that occurred in 1997 show two different cell phone
numbers for Sheriff Olsen. A picture taken in the emergency operations center shows a cell
number of 521-3861. Ex 0. A picture taken from a fon:vard operations center shows a cell
number of 521-0209. Ex N. The number for the back-up cell phone at issue in this case is 5210209.
The State attempts to dismiss the void for vagueness arguments as being inapplicable
hypotheticals. However, the State fails to address the issue involving home telephones that were
paid for by Jefferson County for the Sheriff and his deputies. There was no prohibition on using
the home phone to make personal calls. Common sense dictates that the p1imary use of the home
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phone was for personal calls. The issue of home phones is identical to the issue of the cell phone
caITied

Marie.

there was no additional expense to

County from Marie's personal

use of the phone. Thus, the primary purpose of the back-up cell phone was the same as the
p1imary purpose of the home phone, which was to be able to reach the Sheriff. Both were paid
for by the County because both were detennined to have a valid govermnental purpose.
Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) is unconstitutionally vague as it applies to Sheriff Olsen
because the statute is worded in a way that allows arbitrary enforcement. What is prohibited is
not clearly defined and is open to interpretation. The statute does not give notice to people of
ordinary intelligence of what is prohibited, and it establishes no guidelines to law enforcement
about how to enforce this statute. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711-12, 69 P.3d 126, 131-32
(2003) abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. A1ichigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 185 L. Ed. 2d 124
(2013).There was no reason for Blair Olsen to know that allowing his wife to caITy and use his
back-up cell phone would violate Idaho Code section 18-5701(10). He made no actual purchase.
His home phone was being paid for by the County. There was no policy at the time that
prevented his cell phone from being used to make personal calls by him or his family members.
Finally, Maiie's use of the cell phone did not result in any additional expense for Jefferson
County. The primary purpose for the back-up cell phone was to provide an alternate means of
reaching the Sheriff. Allowing his wife to caITy it ensured that it was always charged and he
could take it if his primary phone stopped working. As well, there was someone available to
answer the phone if the Sheriff could not be reached on his primary number that would know
how to reach the Sheriff. This allowed the She1iff to do his job or to do it better, which the State
argues is consistent with the statute. As such, the Statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to
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Sheriff Olsen.
The trial court subjected Blair Olsen to multiple punishments for a single course of
conduct by alfowing three separate felony counts. This vvas a violation of the Double
Jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution and the trial court's decision should be
reversed and the counts dismissed.

The State claims that the arguments regarding enor relative to the motion to dismiss or
consolidate tl1e tl1ree separate cl1arges i11to a si11gle cl1arge ca1111ot pre~lail because Olse11 did 11ot

request the entirety of the trial transcript. It is true that the entire trial transcript was not
requested. However, the trial transcript has no bearing on the Trial Judge's decision. The motion
to dismiss or consolidate based on double jeopardy was decided by the Trial Judge before trial.
Whether double jeopardy applies is a question of law to be decided by the Trial Judge and not a
jury. State v. l'vfoad, 156 Idaho 654, 658, 330 P.3d 400,404 (Ct. App. 2014), review denied (Aug.
15, 2014) (stating that it is the "court" that conducts the double jeopardy analysis). The State
relies on Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292,293,612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980) for the proposition
that Olsen cannot prevail because he failed to provide the entire trial transcript. However, the
Court in Rutter specifically held that enor would not be presumed in that case involving the
interpretation of a contract because the appellant failed to bring "before this Court on this appeal
a record of the proceedings in the district comi at which the comi concluded that the General
Conditions were intended to be a part of the pariies' contract. Nor has appellant brought before
this Court a copy of the district court's order compelling submission of the parties' dispute to
arbitration." In this case Olsen has presented the decision on the motion to dismiss or consolidate
and the transcript from the hearing where the Trial Judge issued the decision. The trial transcript
has no relevance to the decision made by the judge at the pre-trial motion hearing.
Afoad requires a court to detennine whether criminal conduct is one offense or several

Appellant's Reply Brief - Page 11

offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. The Comi of Appeals stated:
\\i11ether a course of criminal conduct constitutes one offense or several depends
upon "whether or not the conduct constituted separate, distinct and independent
crimes." State v. 1'1ajor, 111 Idaho 410, 414, 725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986). This "can
be a troublesome question," id. (footnote omitted), and "requires an inquiry into
the circumstances of the conduct and consideration of the 'intent and
objective of the actor.' "State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 34, 951 P.2d 1249, 1261
(1997) (quotingA1ajor, 111 Idaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119).
Id. at 660, 330 P.3d at 406. The Trial Judge in this case made no findings regarding the intent

and objective of Blair Olsen in allowing his wife to ca1Ty his back-up cell phone. Blair Olsen's
stated purpose was to have the phone ready and charged in the event he needed it or if someone
was unable to reach him on his primary phone. There is no evidence that Blair Olsen
reconsidered his decision each month that Marie had possession of the cell phone. Additionally,
he specifically directed her not to go over on minutes or incur additional charges. The intent and
the objective of Blair Olsen was not to commit a separate crime each month that Marie had the
cell phone. Blair Olsen's conduct was part of a single course of conduct and cam1ot be treated as
separate, distinct and independent crimes.
The State dismisses the inquiry into Blair Olsen's intent and objective as being in conflict
with the legislative intent of Idaho Code section 18-5702(4)(a). That is not true. The A1oad
analysis is used to detennine whether or not ce1iain conduct constitutes separate, independent
and distinct criminal acts or a single criminal act. Section 18-5702(4)(a) allows for the
aggregation of "separate incidents." It does not state what constitutes "separate incidents." Thus
the }Joad analysis must be conducted to detem1ine if the criminal conduct constitutes separate
incidents or if it is a single criminal act. Only if it is detem1ined that there were separate
incidents does 18-5702(4)(a) become applicable. The separate incidents can be aggregated under
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the statute if it can be shown that the separate incidents were paii of a common scheme or plan.
l11oad analysis and 18-5702(4)(a) are not in conflict. But the "1!oad analysis must be

conducted before 18-5702(4)(a) can be used to aggregate the conduct.
The Trial Judge, in denying the motion to dismiss or consolidate on double jeopardy
grounds, deten11ined that a "reasonable jury could conclude that there were separate and distinct
acts here in this case." Mot. to Dismiss Tr. p. 50, L. 25

p. 52, L. 8. \Vhether there were separate

incidents is a precursor to deten11ining whether those incidents can be aggregated into a single
act under Idaho Code section 18-5702(4)(a). Thus, the Trial Judge did not decide as matter of
law that double jeopardy did or did not apply. He simply treated it as a question of fact to be
ultimately decided by the jury. Again, Moad clearly states that issues involving double jeopardy
are "questions of law." Moad, 156 Idaho at 658, 330 P.3d at 404. The Trial Judge erred in
leaving the decision to the jury to deten11ine whether there were separate and distinct acts or a
single act. As well, since Blair Olsen's conduct was part of a single transaction, it was not a
se1ies of separate, distinct, and independent crimes that were part of a co1m11011 scheme or plan
for purposes of aggregation under Idaho Codes section 18-5702(4)(a). The Trial Judge allowed
the State to pursue three separate charges for the same conduct based on calendar years. The
basis for this was the Trial Judges assumption that the calendar years corresponded with different
budgets for Jefferson County. Mot. to Dismiss Tr. p. 50, L. 25 - p. 52, L. 8. There was no
evidence that this assumption was true. Each of the County Co1m11issioners and their executive
assistant testified at tiial and the State never elicited any testimony about budget years. Each of
those transc1ipts are in the record. More importantly, there is no evidence that at the beginning of
each year Blair Olsen decided to again to allow his wife to carry his back-up cell phone that was
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already in her possession.
The State confuses a single offense with a common scheme or

State claims that

has now admitted that the use of public funds was part of a common scheme or plan. The
State misunderstands the argument. The argument is that Olsen's conduct was a single act that
occuned when he allmved Marie to cany his back-up cell phone. Thus, he could not be punished
multiple times for a single act. Olsen has never claimed that his conduct was a se1ies of separate
incidents that were paii of a common scheme or plan. \V11at is argued is that the T1ial Judge
never made a specific finding that Olsen's conduct constituted multiple separate incidents that
were paii of a common scheme or plan that could be consolidated into "one (1) count" as
provided by Idaho Code section 18-5702(4)(a).
The State argues that Olsen used public money to pay for his wife's private cell phone on
28 separate occasions. Again, this is factually inaccurate. The cell phone was not Marie's p1ivate
phone. It was the She1iff's back-up cell phone that he allowed her to cany and use to make
personal calls. As well, Sheriff Olsen never paid for the cell phone. Claims were submitted each
month to the Jefferson County Commissioners and it was the Co1mnissioners that made payment
to the cell phone company. The Trial Court did recognize the separate monthly payments.
However, the T1ial Comi never made an inquiry into Blair Olsen's intent or objective and
whether his intent was to commit a separate crime each month when he sent the claim to the
County Commissioners. There was no evidence at the time the Judge made the decision to
support such a conclusion. Olsen made one decision to give his wife his back-up cell phone. That
decision was not reconsidered each month when the County Commissioners paid the cell phone
bill. It was not a separate, distinct and individual c1ime that was c01mnitted each month. It was
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one decision that was not revisited on a monthly or yearly basis.
if it was detem1ined that Olsen's conduct constituted separate incidents that were
part of a common scheme and plan, the aggregation of separate incidents cannot be consolidated
into three different counts as was pennitted in this case. The separate incidents can only be
aggregated into "one (1) count." I.C. § 18-5702(4)(a).
Regardless of the analysis applied to the conduct, the Trial Comi erred. There should
have only been one count related to the cell phone either because it was one offense or if it was
separate offenses that were paii of a conunon scheme or plan it could only be aggregated into a
single count. As such, the counts should be dismissed in their entirety or consolidated into a
single count.

IV.
CONCLUSION
The conviction of Blair Olsen should be ove1iumed and the three felony counts for
violation of Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) should be dismissed. Blair Olsen's 1ight to not be
punished multiple times for the same offense was violated when the trial court allowed the State
to charge three separate felonies for the single act of allowing his wife to carry his back-up cell
phone. That was one decision that was not revisited by the Sheriff on a monthly or yearly basis
because allowing her to use the phone did not incur any additional expense for the county than
when the phone was maintained by the Sheriff.
Additionally, the prosecution of She1iff Olsen involved a non-justiciable political
question. This is an issue involving the constitutional principle of sepai·ation of powers. \Vhether
or not the Sheriff should be allowed to have a back-up cell phone that was carried by his wife
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was a policy decision that was within the power vested in the Jefferson County Board of
Commissioners by the Idaho Constitution and Idaho statutes. As the authority to make this
decision was completely vested in a separate branch of govenu11ent, the comi had no jurisdiction
to hear the matter and the State could not collaterally attack the decision made by the County
Commissioners.
Finally, Idaho code section 18-5701(10) is unconstitutionally vague. The statute does not
provide notice of what conduct is prohibited because the ten11s are not defined and are subject to
contradicting interpretations. The law gives no direction to law enforcement about how to
enforce the statute. By the very language of the law, law enforcement must subjectively and
arbitrarily decide what purchases with public funds are made for a purely personal purpose or for
purposes other than for the use and benefit of a govenunental entity. Thus the conviction should
be overturned and the charges against Blair Olsen should be dismissed.

/::-th day of June, 2016.
DATED this \_7
COOPER & LARSEN
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